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In 1937, Harold Nicolson, still the best-known modern writer on diplomacy, wrote a 
slim volume with the title The Evolution of Diplomatic Method. In 2011, Keith 
Hamilton and Richard Langhorne released the second edition of their The Practice of 
Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration. The last century has seen a 
series of books, essays and even blog spots on diplomacy that advertise themselves as 
somehow evolutionary. However, almost all of them use the concept of evolution in 
the everyday sense of emergence.2 They do not make reference to evolutionary 
theory, and they do not try to understand diplomacy as an institution evolved by the 
species. On the contrary, pre-Darwin style, they tend either to place the beginnings of 
history with writing or, following Hegel, with the emergence of what they refer to as 
states. Either way, they tend to treat diplomacy as something evolved not by the 
species in general, but by specific states or by diplomacy itself. As a result, seventy 
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years after Nicolson, the standard thing to do in the general literature is still to place 
the beginnings of diplomacy in ancient Greece (Nicolson 1937; Kurizaki 2011).  
 
Within the multidisciplinary field of diplomacy studies that has emerged over the past 
three decades or so, there is a slight twist to this theme where the beginnings are 
concerned. Impressed by work carried out by the likes of Munn-Rankin and Raymond 
Cohen (Munn-Rankin 1956; Cohen and Westbrook 2000), the beginnings of 
diplomacy are now increasingly placed in the Eastern Mediterranean during the third 
millennium B.C. It is certainly the fact that the first documented diplomatic system 
we know of, the so-called Amarna system, emerged in this geographical area some 
time around the middle of the second millennium BC. The word ‘documented’ should 
give their game away, however, for this way of dating the origins of diplomacy hangs 
on the nineteenth century idea that history equals writing. The basic idea behind this 
dating is still that the institution of diplomacy follows the emergence of a particular 
political order, namely that sustained by what is usually but misleadingly referred to 
as pristine ancient states such as Mesopotamia, China and the Aztek polity(Fried 
1967; compare Renfrew and Cherry 1988).  
 
The take in this chapter is different. Following the definitions made by Dirk Messner, 
Alejandro Guarín and Daniel Haun in the introduction to this volume, I treat 
diplomacy as a meso level of cooperation, with environmental factors understood as 
social selection processes taking the role of macro level. Put differently, the 
perspective taken here is that diplomacy as an emergent institution is shaped by its 
social and material environment. Humanity shapes diplomacy, and diplomacy shapes 
humanity. The two are co-constitutive. The overall theme of the book is how 
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cooperation in general, with diplomacy being one kind of cooperation, constitutes 
humanity, and this is a theme here as well. The stress is on the other story, however; 
how humanity evolves diplomacy. This is because one point of the exercise is to say 
something about how diplomacy is changing here and now, and in order to do that, it 
is optimal to focus on how it has changed in the past. 
 
There are obvious costs involved in using an evolutionary perspective on diplomacy. 
When the focus is on humanity’s agency in general, the agency of specific humans is 
occluded. So are issues of power, and also of meaning. An evolutionary perspective is 
necessarily functionalist, which easily spells circularity if a causal reading is insisted 
upon. By the same token, organicism is a dangerous trap. Natural selection is 
guaranteed by biological factors that do not immediately translate into the social. 
There is no biological mutational logic in the social. When we speak of social 
mutations, we are speaking metaphorically. There is no such thing as social natural 
selection. Social selection processes are to do with factors such as density of habitat, 
social complexity, competition and cooperation regarding resources. They give rise to 
social phenomena such as specific forms of signaling and communication. The 
emergence of language would be a key example. A more recent one would be the 
emergence of the world wide web. These are stochastic factors, as opposed to natural 
ones. These are all very good reasons why nobody has really applied an evolutionary 
way of thinking to diplomacy before. When I nonetheless think this is an exercise 
worth the candle, it is because an evolutionary frame gives us a kind of longue durée 
overview that is not readily available from elsewhere. It is in this spirit, and keeping 
in mind how evoking evolution may all too easily steer us down an asocial biologistic 
path, that I nonetheless find it useful to take evolutionary thinking to the case of 
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diplomacy. In terms of beginnings, there is no reason why we should not begin our 
investigation as early as extant proof of human cooperation allows. The longue durée 
view allows us to speculate about further evolution of diplomacy from a wider and 
hence more solid base than if we think more short-term, say in centuries. Here we 
may already complement dominant approaches within diplomatic studies, which tend 
to see change in diplomacy as a result of dynamics internal to diplomacy itself (but 
see Der Derian 1987; Neumann 2011; Bátora and Hynek forthcoming). Applying an 
evolutionary perspective to diplomacy is one way to demonstrate how diplomacy 
grows out of general social and environmental change.  
 
I begin this chapter by discussing the general emergence of human cooperation and 
how it relates to diplomacy. Given the state of our knowledge, this part is necessarily 
speculative, and so I throw in some notes on method. Part two discusses earlier 
evolutionary work, or, to be more precise, the earlier work, on diplomacy. Part three 
tries to move the discussion forward by introducing and applying the idea of 
evolutionary tipping-points to the study of diplomacy. Tipping-points are understood 
here as the moment when long-term selection processes crystallise in diplomatic 
institutionalization. To be absolutely clear, let me give an example of concrete 
procedure. I do not argue that, say, the founders of the League of Nations had no 
agency, or that questions of culture-specific power were not very important indeed to 
this process. Far from denying this, I use an evolutionary perspective to focus on the 
long-term preconditions for this tipping-point of multilateral diplomacy. Evolutionary 
thinking enables a focus on the line to be drawn from early gathering of tribes in a 
number of global locations, via Christian church meetings in the mediaeval period and 
so-called congress meetings by states, to the early stirrings of permanent multilateral 
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diplomacy in nineteenth century institutions such as the Central Commission for the 
Navigation on the Rhine and the International Telegraph Union. Having introduced 
the idea of tipping-points, the rest of part three looks for moments when the 
institutionalization of diplomacy firmed historically, and identity six such tipping-
points. In conclusion, I speculate about the emergence of a seventh tipping-point, 
which challenges the present hierarchy of diplomatic agents. 
 
Evolution and cooperation 
If, in the spirit of evolutionary theory, we discard the idea that history starts with 
writing and that civilization somehow starts with the Ancient Greeks, and instead 
think of diplomacy as the institutionalized communication between groups, we get 
another picture. We must then start not from today and go back, genealogy fashion, 
but reverse temporality and ask how the species was able to evolve cooperation in the 
first place. Humanity evolves cooperation, and cooperation evolves humanity, in 
standard evolutionary circular fashion. 
 
Homo Sapiens has lived in foraging bands since it emerged some two hundred 
thousand years ago, and also has a prehistory of doing so. Such bands are dependent 
on a certain level of cooperation for finding and processing food, reproducing, etc. 
Note that inter-group relations were probably fairly intense: ‘Contemporary foraging 
groups, which are probably not that different in migratory patterns from their 
prehistorical ancestors, are remarkably outbred compared to even the simplest 
farming societies, from which we can infer that dealing with strangers in short-term 
relationships was a common feature of our evolutionary history’ (Gintis et al. 2005: 
26). 
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By archaeological consensus, the level of cooperation increased radically as a 
response to an environmental factor, namely the possibility of capturing big game. 
Regardless of hunting method (driving animals into abysses, digging holes, spearing 
etc.), this would take a group rather than an individual. As demonstrated by a 
succession of scholars reaching from Peter Kropotkin (1902) via John Maynard Smith 
(1964) to Matt Ridley (1996) and Christopher Boehm (1999, 2011), the result of 
collaboration was pivotal in evolutionary terms, because it immediately led to a 
change in the unit of natural selection. To riff off a quote from Messner, Guarín, and 
Haun’s introduction to this volume, ‘[p]erhaps the most remarkable aspect of 
evolution is its ability to generate cooperation in a competitive world. Thus, we might 
add ‘natural cooperation’ as a third fundamental Principle of evolution beside natural 
and sexual selection (Nowak 2006: 1563). 
 
When the species was young, selection was individual. With increased cooperation, 
the unit of selection changed from individual to group. I will follow Boehm and take 
the increased level of cooperation to follow on from the event of big game hunting, 
and to see big game hunting as ushering in a political revolution. For leading 
individuals, this revolution posed a challenge, for the superior individual hunting 
skills which had made them leading were no longer an optimal environmental fit on 
their own, but had to be complemented by skills pertaining to leadership and 
collaboration. This change was driven by leveling behavior, which means that alpha 
males were lived down by coalitions who went in for sharing of food, group sanctions 
and suchlike (compare Shostak 1976).3  
 
7 
 
As is the rule in archaeology, if we want to date this, we are dependent on material 
findings. We have no guarantee that our findings equal the first occurrences of the 
phenomenon in question, for new findings may always antedate our oldest ones to 
date. Boehm talks about the explosion in cooperation as a ‘Late Pleistocene 
revolution’, and dates it to about 100.000 BC. This dating is not very convincing. In 
the mid-1990s, eight throwing spears were found together with thousands of horse 
bones in Schöningen, Germany (Thieme 2007). That find dated big game hunting to 
about 300.000 years ago. Big game hunting may be even older, however, witness the 
find of stone-tipped spears used by Homo Heidelbergiensis, the common ancestor of 
Homo Sapiens and Neanderthals, that dates back more than half a million years 
(Wilkins et al. 2012). We simply do not know whether these spears were used for big 
game hunting. What is reasonably clear, however, is that the advent of big game 
hunting happened magnituides before the time suggested by Boehm. 
 
Note that even if qualitative increase in cooperation was immense, changes were 
rather limited in terms of group size. Our best estimate of the average size of hunter 
gatherer groups based on anthropological studies of bands living under conditions 
roughly similar to those that dominated  Pleistocene habitats would be around 37 
(Marlowe 2005). Most groups would have been larger, however, so that the 
Pleistocene human would probably have lived in a group numbering perhaps 70 to 
120 individuals.4  
 
All this is fairly well established by archaeologists. The key reason why this 
knowledge has not been applied to the study of diplomacy is probably to do with the 
focus on another social response to group selection, namely war. Extant evolutionary 
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literature has focused on how cooperation may help one group outcompete another. In 
a primer on microeconomic foundations, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis state that  
 
[I]t has been conventional since Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan to attribute the 
maintenance of social order to states. But for at least 95% of the time that 
biologically modern humans have existed, our ancestors somehow fashioned a 
system of governance that without the assistance of governments avoided the 
chaos of the Hobbesian state of nature sufficiently to become by far the most 
enduring of social orders ever. The genetic, archaeological, ethnographic, and 
demographic data make it quite clear that they did not accomplish this by 
limiting human interactions to a few close genetic relatives. [Rather,…] a 
particular form of altruism, often hostile toward outsiders and punishing 
toward insiders who violate norms, coevolved with a set of institutions—
sharing food and making war are examples—that at once protected a group’s 
altruistic members and made group-level cooperation the sine qua non of 
survival (Bowles and Gintis 2011: 5).  
 
Following Darwin ([1873] 1998: 134-5), they argue that group conflict is an 
important driver of evolution, for it lays down an imperative that groups have to 
galvanize against other groups, and those who evolve the highest level of what they 
call parochial altruism will have an advantage that will crowd out other groups 
(Bowles and Gintis 2011: 133-47).5 
 
The debate over whether war is an evolutionary necessity or not—and this debate is of 
interest to us as its existence is arguably the main reason why so little attention has 
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been paid to Pleistocene non-conflictual inter-group relations—is as old as the social 
sciences themselves. From Darwin there winds a continuous line of thought that 
argues in favour of war’s necessity, usually under the banner of conflict theory of the 
origin of the state. Conflict theorists tend to stress the key evolutionary advantage of 
effective leadership for war, and war’s key role in securing new ecological niches for 
certain groups at the expense of others.6 Against these thinkers stand those who stress 
how war is but one of the institutions of social history. An early example is 
Kropotkin, author of a famous 1902 monograph on cooperation, but Kropotkin had 
little to say on intra-group relations. Another is the last of the post-war generation of 
evolutionists, Elman Service, whose work on the origins of large-scale political 
organization focused on the classical functionalist theme of systems maintenance 
rather than on conflict. But Service, too, no more than hints at the importance of what 
he refers to as external relations. Here is the key quote on the matter from his magnum 
opus: 
 
[…] primitive people recognize the danger of warfare and take measures to 
reduce its likelihood. These measures are various, of course, but they are all 
reducible to one generic mode of alliance-making, the reciprocal exchange. 
Reciprocal exchanges are the ways in which all kinship organizations extend 
or intensify the normal interpersonal bonds of kinship statuses. Any two 
relationships of kinship imply standardized obligations and rights that are 
symbolized by exchanges of goods and favors (as well as by prescribed forms 
of etiquette). Such exchanges are normally both utilitarian and symbolic. 
[…They are mainly of two kinds:] marriages and exchanges of goods (Service 
1975: 60-1).7 
10 
 
 
Standardized obligations and rights, reciprocal exchange, prescribed forms of 
etiquette; here we have come to the subject at hand, namely diplomacy. With the 
partial exception of Ridley’s (1996) already referenced book, later archaeological 
work has not followed up on Service’s observation, however. 
 
To sum up so far, for reasons that are to do with pre-Darwinian approaches to our 
past, the field of diplomatic studies have largely ignored the period before the third 
millennium BC. Whereas some kind of small-scale collaboration seems to be as old as 
the species itself, with the dawn of the late Pleistocene some 126.000 years ago, big 
game hunting inaugured a political revolution based on heightened levels of 
cooperation. Pleistocene inter-group relations have, however, been largely studied in 
one aspect only, namely that of warfare. The observation is sometimes made that 
other environmental challenges, such as natural catastrophes, may make for inter-
group collaboration, and it is acknowledged that gift-making, most basically in the 
Lévi-Staussian tapping of the exchange of women, is an ancient phenomenon. That, 
however, is where extant scholarship seems to stop. 
 
Earlier work on diplomacy in evolutionary perspective 
Well, not quite. As far as I am aware, there is one, and only one, scholar who breaks 
with this pattern. In the 1930s, Ragnar Numelin left his native Finland to write his 
doctorate with his compatriot, evolutionary anthropologist and LSE professor in 
sociology Edvard Westermarck.  The result was published in 1950 (when Numelin 
was working at the Finnish legation in Brussels) as The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A 
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Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations.8 Numelin (1950: 14) is a 
bit shy, stating at the outset that he is  
 
not thinking in terms of evolutionary anthropology or history […but only 
wants] to emphasize the sociological side of the question: that we should study 
also the social ‘diplomatic’ culture in the savage world and not, as has often 
been done, confine ourselves to conditions prevailing among ‘historical’ 
peoples.  
 
Already on the next page, however, he states that ‘it is an astonishing fact that we can 
observe, among savage peoples, the beginnings of a great many forms of development 
which actually belong to far higher stages of civilization’. If this is not evolution-
speak, then what is? There follow chapters that set out detailed catalogues of 
embryonic forms of hospitality, inter-group heralds and messengers, peace negotiators 
and war emissaries, treaty-making and trade. 
 
Numelin begins, in the tradition from Kropotkin, with a critique of other theorists, 
evolutionists included, for making the unwarranted assumption that war was the key 
political phenomenon of hunter and gatherer existence. For example, he notes that 
Herbert Spencer admitted ‘the peaceful origin of primitive political organization’, but 
nonetheless held the ‘false conception’ that war was key to it, simply because he had, 
by drawing on Ratzel and other German researchers, ‘deliberately selected features 
from later savage and ‘barbarous’ life as the starting-point of his political theories’ 
(Numelin 1950: 67). Here, Numelin is foreshadowing present-day attacks on the 
entire political canon from Hobbes to Pinker for having, willfully and on weak or 
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even non-existent empirical grounds, created a prehistory which the archaeological 
evidence such as it is, does not support (see any chapter in this book). Numelin goes 
on to note examples which were known at the time, such as pre-contact Tasmania. He 
sees what we may call an early tipping-point in totemism, as ‘[M]embers of tribes 
with the same totem are generally well treated even if they should be strangers’ 
(Numelin 1950: 111). Drawing on Malinowski’s classical work on the Trobriands, he 
notes the practice of cleansing strangers of their taboo by having a village girl ‘act as 
the stranger’s partner for the night’ (Numelin 1950: 113). Another widespread 
practice was the presentation of (other) gifts (1950: 156). There is also the practice of 
the peace-invocating festival, such as the Mindarie-feasts of the Diery of Australia 
(1950: 141). The general practice on display here is hospitality, offered not least out 
of a fear of unknown supernatural powers. 
 
Numelin (1950: 130) goes on to detail the emergence of the messenger, who was 
personally inviolable and who was ‘selected with great discrimination out of those 
members of the tribe or local group who enjoy general esteem and often belong to the 
most outstanding persons in the tribe’. Inviolability sometimes spread to commercial 
agents (1950: 152). War messengers are widespread amongst hunter-gatherer 
populations; Numelin (1950: 178) takes issue with older literature which held that 
formal declarations of war amongst ‘primitives’ were not necessary. The central case 
is the peace messenger, however.9 Numelin (1950: 170-71, comp. 214) gives as one 
example the Arunta of Australia: 
 
When a fight breaks out among the Arunta, and one of the parties wish to 
make it up, they send a man and his wife as messengers to the other camp. In 
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order to try the adversaries’ readiness to make peace the messenger has to put 
his wife at their disposal. If the offer is accepted and the men accordingly enter 
into intercourse with the messenger’s wife – this act is called Noa (conjux) or 
Ankalla (‘cousinship’) – a favourable issue of the political situation may be 
expected; if it is rejected, the fighting continues. 
 
Note the use of kinship terminology here. A typical accoutrement of tribal 
messengers, which may be traced on all continents, is the message stick (1950: 164) 
which served as identification and as a mnemonic aid for the messenger, a clear 
forerunner of the ancient Greek double-folded sheets framed and carried around the 
neck by messengers and called diploun – the phenomenon that has given diplomacy 
its name. 
 
A key finding, from which Numelin (1950: 203) struggles in vain to find exceptions, 
is the appearance of ‘feasts and drinking bouts’ when peace is negotiated. The 
seemingly ubiquitous appearance of feasts gives the lie to those who see all the eating 
and drinking entered into by diplomats as an unnecessary luxury. The commensality 
of eating and drinking is an institution which can be observed amongst all known 
polities who do business with one another, and must therefore be seen as a historically 
necessary practice of diplomacy (Neumann 2013a). A special, and widespread, case is 
the blood-brotherhood, often sealed by the drinking of blood.10 We need not heed 
Numelin’s (1950: 211) speculation that this may be a forerunner of the drinking of 
one another’s health, but do note that kinship terminology makes yet another 
appearance in the so-called pledging in blood. 
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To sum up, Numelin certainly looks at diplomacy as something that is being evolved 
by the species itself. He does identify a number of precursors of phenomena that we 
may trace down through written cultures (more on this below). As seen from the 
present, however, there is a key weakness in Numelin’s method. His sources are, and 
had to be, given the time at which it was written, exclusively those of anthropologists 
who have studied hunters and gatherers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and he jumbles them all together. Some of these groups may be similar to pre-
sedentary human polities in their material base, but we would not know, for Numelin 
does not discuss the matter. In their social organisation, however, these groups have 
had just as much time, roughly 11.000 years, to evolve as have sedentary societies, 
and a number of them will have been marked by their contact with those sedentaries. 
James C. Scott (2009), who has written insightfully on how states actually may 
produce non-state societies, has gone so far as to argue that, ‘[W]e have virtually no 
credible evidence about the world until yesterday and, until we do, the only defensible 
intellectual position is to shut up’ (Scott 2013: 15). This is clearly an overstatement. 
As demonstrated at the beginning of this article, archaeologists have excavated a lot 
of stuff that they have turned into evidence, although Scott is of course right that this 
evidence is tentative, and so not necessarily credible, particularly to someone who 
does not seem to have taken the time to examine it. This is, however, a point one 
could wage against all knowledge about the social, as Scott himself has repeatedly 
underlined. Principally, it is therefore an untenable position for a working academic 
not to build on our scholarly knowledge such as it is, and try to widen and deepen that 
knowledge. Exit Scott. 
 
A new approach to the history of diplomacy: Tipping points 
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When Numelin is building exclusively on evidence culled from hunter-gatherer 
groups observed by anthropologists, this is because the data available at the time 
when he was writing, in the 1930s, made it very hard to do anything else. As a result, 
Numelin was condemned to stop at cataloguing relevant phenomena (as they were 
evident from the anthropological record) and could not go on to attempt much 
theorization. He does not look at what the evolutionist Morton Fried (1967, in the 
context of the change from chiefdoms to states) refers to as ‘leaps’ of evolution. It 
seems to me that an attempt to pinpoint candidates for such leaps, tipping points or, to 
use evolution-speak, punctuated equilibrium effects (Eldredge and Gould [1972] 
1985; for a recent critical assessment, see Scott 2007) must be the next logical step in 
applying evolutionary thinking to the case of diplomacy.11 
 
For an illustration of how such leaps or tipping-points work analytically, let me 
reproduce an example from a much-used primer on game theory, whose sub-title is 
‘An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions’ (Young 1998).  The example concerns not 
diplomacy, but the rather less unwieldy (because binary) example of which side of the 
road to drive on: 
 
In the early stages, when there was relatively little traffic on the roads and its 
range was limited, conventions grew up locally; a city or province would have 
one convention, while a few miles down the road another jurisdiction would 
have the opposite one. As use of the roads increased and people traveled 
further afield, these local rules tended to congeal first into regional and then 
into national norms, though for the most part these norms were not codified as 
traffic laws until well into the nineteenth century. In areas with highly 
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fragmented jurisdictions, the congealing process took longer, as an 
evolutionary model would predict. Italy, for example, was characterized by 
highly localized left-hand driving rules until well into the twentieth century. 
Once conventions became established at the national level, the interactions are 
between countries, who [sic] are influenced by their neighbors: if enough of 
them follow the same convention, it pays to follow suit. Over time, we would 
expect a single convention to sweep across the board. While this intuition is 
essentially correct, it ignores the effect of idiosyncratic shocks, which can 
displace one convention in favor of another. Remarkably, just such a shock 
occurred in the history of European driving: the French Revolution. Up to that 
time, it was customary for carriages in France as well as in many other parts of 
Europe to keep to the left when passing. This meant that pedestrians often 
walked on the right to face the oncoming traffic. Keeping to the left was 
therefore associated with the privileged classes, while keeping to the right was 
considered more ‘democratic.’ Following the French Revolution, the 
convention was changed for symbolic reasons. Subsequently Napoleon 
adopted the new custom for his armies, and it spread to some of the countries 
he occupied. From this point onward, one can see a gradual but steady shift—
moving more or less from west to east—in favor of right-hand rule. For 
example, Portugal, whose only border was with right-driving Spain, converted 
after World War I. Austria switched province by province, beginning with 
Vorarlberg and Tyrol in the west and ending with Vienna in the east, which 
held out until the Anschluss with Germany in 1938. Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia also converted under duress at about this time. The last 
continental European country to change from left to right was Sweden in 1967. 
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Thus we see a dynamic response to an exogenous shock (the French 
Revolution) that played out over the course of almost two hundred years 
(Young 1998: 16-17). 
 
Since this is a multi-disciplinary volume and I have tipped my hat to economics by 
quoting the likes of Samuel Bowles and Peyton Young, it is only fair that I now be 
allowed a moment to blow my own horn: When Young the economist is looking 
around for a key example, he comes up with stuff foregrounding politics: the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, the Anschluss. There is a 
pointer here to how tipping-points, understood as the culmination of long-term trends, 
are institutionalized; it often happens in the context of attempted learning once the 
victors (and sometimes the losers, too) have had the chance to sit down and ponder 
what went wrong the last time. Note, however, the contingent character of the social 
changes that brought on right-hand driving. By the same token, I am not prepared to 
privilege any one set of factors that determine diplomacy. Social evolution does not 
work like that. Stuff emerges, becomes problematized and leads to cooperational and 
conflictual behavior without the organic laws of biology to underpin the process, 
which therefore remains stochastic.  
 
Young’s binary example (left-hand driving vs. right-hand driving) may only help us 
part of the way, for it occludes the analogue nature of more complex social changes 
such as those pertaining to diplomacy. Most social stuff is not like the question of 
which side of the road to drive on, but rather preserves pre-tipping point stuff as part 
of the whole picture. The social is like a palimpsest, where older practices shine 
through amongst the dominant and newest ones.12 Specifically, diplomacy may reach 
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a tipping point, and as seen from the time intervals between them, history seems to be 
speeding up so that we now spend centuries or even decades rather than millennia in 
reaching a new tipping point. Once the tipping point has been reached, however, 
previous practices do not simply disappear, but tend to hover. One contemporary 
example would be how a state like Russia is markedly less involved in multilateral 
practices than is, say, Germany. 
 
In part one of this chapter, we already encountered one leap or tipping-point that has 
been further evidenced by fossil findings, namely the late Pleistocene political 
revolution brought on by the possibility of big game hunting some 300.000 years ago. 
Here, the selection process was driven by increased complexity in signaling. While 
this revolution first and foremost had the effect of increasing the value of in-group 
cooperation, it also suggested the possibility of cooperation between groups. Such 
cooperation would take diplomacy to come into being. Let us call the Pleistocene 
revolution a proto-diplomatic tipping-point. 
 
Note that 'cooperation' is a positively loaded word, and this occludes the importance 
of social relations for it to work. Every social scientist is, for example, familiar with 
Rousseau's fable of the stag hunt, where the point is that if only one of a hunting party 
spots a hare and breaks rank by killing it, the cooperative scheme to catch a stag will 
fall apart. The antidote to this is the wielding of social power. To pick an example 
from the life of contemporary hunters and gatherers once again, in an ethnographic 
study of the !Kung, Shostak (1976) found that of the hours of quotidian conversation 
that she had recorded on tape, over one-third was spent on criticising selected good 
hunters for not being cooperative enough, often within their earshot or even to their 
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faces. If all known human settings display the use of power to keep cooperative 
schemes on the tracks, it is a safe assumption that the same  went for the late 
Pleistocene revolution, and that it was, consequently, power-laden.  
 
This is important, for it should remind us of how cooperative schemes such as 
diplomacy are shot through with power relations. It is, for example, not the case that 
diplomacy is the opposite of war (see Barkawi, forthcoming). It is, rather, the opposite 
of not talking to the enemy. Diplomacy is attempts by socially designated 
representatives at handling difference on group level by means of a cocktail of 
practices with talk being paramount amongst them. The major importance of the late 
Pleistocene revolution to diplomacy, then, lies in the way it further institutionalized 
cooperative schemes as a standard modus operandi of human life in general. It 
enhanced the social space for action taken on other bases than at spear-point as well 
as for non-verbal and, in historical perspective, verbal communication of a non-
violent but definitely power-laden kind.13 
 
Numelin’s work suggests a second tipping-point, namely totemism, which may serve 
as a template for turning living beings who were before considered impossible to talk 
to into interlocateurs valable by offering a ground on which to cooperate, namely the 
fact of sharing a common totem. While this is a highly tentative idea, if we fast-
forward from hunter-gatherer groups to societies about which we have written 
knowledge, we do see a similar mechanism in operation. In all known early examples 
of diplomatic practices, kinship appears as a template. The Amarna system, named 
after the findings of stone tablets documenting correspondence between 1300 BC 
polities such as Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria and the Hittite polity Hatti, a key theme is 
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the ongoing attempts by the other Kings to have the Egyptians acknowledge them as 
brothers, and not sons. The ancient Greek practice of ‘discovering’ kin, invariably 
groups of barbarians so strong that they could not be ignored but had somehow to be 
dealt with, with the Macedonians being a prime example, brings out the logic 
(Neumann 2011). Kinship offers a language of categorization within which 
diplomatic maneuvering may take place. This still goes on within what is, appositely, 
often diplomatically called the ‘family’ of nations, i.e. the states system. Similar 
practices are known from other diplomatic systems, such as the Iroquois League 
which operated ca. 1300-1750. Given the overwhelming importance of kinship for all 
political organization, we are on fairly safe ground in assuming that the use of 
kinship-speak constituted a tipping-point of very old standing. How old, we have no 
way of knowing. Note that, contrary to the first tipping point, which springs from a 
material factor, namely that the end of the Pleistocene ice age brought a warmer 
climate conducive to the emergence of edible megafauna, this tipping point is brought 
on by social organization itself.  
 
A third tipping-point is suggested by recent archaeological research, and concerns the 
process of sedentarization. The selection processes that drove this was certainly 
habitat density, which led to increased competition between like units and also to 
cooperation amongst them. First, consider the emergence of villages. The earliest 
known cropped up in Anatolia some 7000 years ago, and were not directly tied to 
agriculture. However, those that emerged in Sumer around 3500 BC were. For our 
purposes, the key thing to note is that there was more than one. Thus a pattern was 
initiated where culturally similar but politically distinct entities emerged in the same 
place. Renfrew and Cherry (1988) have called these peer-group polities. These 
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polities interacted on a regular basis, from territorially stable positions. The result was 
institutionalized patterns of interaction, which we may see as the first embryonic 
diplomatic patterns. They have been studied first and foremost for their state-building 
results; Sumerian polities were united under a King already around BC 2900.  
 
The Neolithic period is better understood than earlier periods because it overlapped 
with human memory in a sufficient degree to leave accounts in early writing, and 
because it left more material remnants. One example of these are the stone 
megastructures of what we now call Northern Europe, which have been interpreted as 
constituting a second variant of this third tipping point. Some of these monuments 
have been read as representing the graveyards of different polities, gathered in one 
place, and serving not only as focal points for gatherings of the tribes, but also as 
material constitutive elements of what we may see as early diplomatic systems. For 
example, Renfrew (2007) interprets Stonehenge in this way. Noting that there was too 
much rainfall in Northern Europe for conditions to allow the kind of mud-hut based 
villages that were in evidence in places like Sumer and further south in Europe, he 
postulates that the emerging sedentary culture needed a focus, and that ‘the great 
henges would have served as ceremonial centres and perhaps also as pilgrimage 
centres for their parent communities […] the end product was the emergence of a 
coherent larger community where none was before’ (Renfrew 2007: 155-6). 
 
If Renfrew is right, then there is a line to be drawn from the constitution of diplomatic 
relations centred on henges to the further rise of chiefs heading peer-group polities 
and on to these chiefs vying for supremacy in early state building processes that 
resemble those found in Sumer. Examples include not only British kingdoms, but also 
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Scandinavian ones and their offsprings, such as the Rus’, arising around AD 800-1000 
(Earle 1997, Neumann 2013b). What we may call the Viking world evolved stable 
patterns of diplomatic relations in the area stretching from Britain in the West to Rus’ 
in the east, as well as diplomatic contact with dominating polities further south, such 
as the Byzantine empire. 
 
Byzantium, with its patterned diplomatic relations with surrounding polities, was late 
to the ball, however, for the large-scale diplomatic relations between culturally 
distinct polities in evidence here was spearheaded in the area where Sumer was based, 
the East Mediterranean. Sumer’s successor polity, Akkad, had regular diplomatic 
contacts with other Kingdoms already in the third millennium BC, and eventually 
became a founder member of the first diplomatic system, the second-millennium BC 
Amarna system, consisting of polities such as Babylonia, Egypt and Hatti, whose 
lingua franca was indeed Akkadian (Cohen and Westbrook 2000). The emergence of 
this first large-scale diplomatic system clearly constitutes a fourth tipping-point in the 
evolutionary history of diplomacy, driven by increased social complexity. Note that 
Greece, which is so often seen as the cradle of Western civilization and of diplomacy 
both, constitute an example of the third tipping-point, culturally similar peer-group 
polities interacting, at a time (the fourth century BC) when the fourth tipping point 
had been in evidence elsewhere for 1500 years or so. Where diplomacy is concerned, 
the Greek poleis are an example of evolutionary re-emergence; it is not a tipping-
point. The same would be the case for the already mentioned Iroquois diplomatic 
system in Turtle Island (ca. AD 1300-1750; see Neumann 2011). 
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A fifth tipping-point was reached as social interaction between large-scale polities 
intensified, and the need for more permanent exchanges than that afforded by 
messengers made itself felt. Once again, increased social complexity and more 
advanced signaling characterize the process. The answer was to base exchanges not 
only on messengers, but also on letting people who were sedentary within one polity 
handle relations with other polities on a running basis. There are early examples on 
this, for example traders within the Amarna system, the institution of the proximos in 
ancient Greece, which involved citizens of one polis who were particularly close to 
some other Greek polis, and also in Africa. From the fourth century AD, different 
branches of Christiandom evolved the institution of apocrisiarii, whereby some 
representative of the Catholic Church was resident in Byzantium. The first permanent, 
reciprocal and so fully-fledged example of this institution, which came to be known 
precisely as permanent diplomacy, hails from the fourteenth-century Italian city-state 
system (Neumann 2011). After centuries of wrangling about reciprocity, permanent 
diplomacy went on to become a global phenomenon in the twentieth century. 
 
By then, a sixth tipping-point was already well in the making, driven by increased 
social complexity but also by technological innovation in the area of communication, 
particularly in infrastructure. We know it as internationalism. Its pre-history reached 
back to the institution of the gathering of the tribes, which we touched on already in 
our discussion of Stonehenge. A more elaborate form of this institution took the form 
of the irregular church meetings of the Catholic Church from the fourth century 
onwards and the kurultais that were called to choose successor rulers in the Turko-
Mongol tradition of Eurasian steppe politics. The emergence of ‘international’ (that is, 
with states as members) organizations such as the Central Commission for the 
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Navigation on the Rhine (1815) and the International Telegraph Union and 
International Postal Union during the second half of the nineteenth century brought 
permanence to what was soon to be called multinational diplomacy, just as 
permanence had been brought to bilateral diplomacy some centuries before. With the 
founding of the League of Nations in 1919, permanent multilateral diplomacy went 
global. The work of the thousands of international organizations in evidence today has 
increased the number of people doing diplomatic work enormously, and has lent to 
global diplomacy a much, much more socially dense quality than it had only a 
hundred years ago. Whereas the number of diplomats on the eve of the First World 
War could be counted in four-digit numbers, diplomats working for the state today are 
counted in six-digit numbers, and if we add international civil servants, activists in 
non-governmental organizations, consultants, spin doctors and so on, we probably 
reach a seven-digit number.  
 
To sum up, the evolutionary history of diplomacy may be told by way of identifying 
six tipping points: the late Pleistocene political revolution 300.000 years ago; 
classificatory kinship as a template for regular cooperation (date unknown); regular 
and ritualized contacts between culturally similar small-scale polities (5.500 years 
ago); regular and ritualized contacts between culturally different large-scale polities 
(4.000 years ago); permanent bilateral diplomacy (five centuries ago) and permanent 
multilateral diplomacy (one century ago). This story is summed up in Table 1. 
 
<Here Table 1> 
 
What’s ahead? 
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The nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century saw a tipping-point in 
the evolution of diplomacy as it went permanently multilateral, and the years since 
then have seen an enormous quantitative increase, as the number of practitioners have 
gone from a five-digit to a seven-digit number. In evolutionary terms, diplomacy, as 
an institution of human cooperation, is a great success.  
 
If ask whether today’s diplomatic practices are optimal for the development of further 
cooperation given ongoing changes in environment, then we may observe that today’s 
diplomatic practices have primarily, but not exclusively, grown out of aristocratic 
European social institutions. Since the aristocracy was out-manuoeuvred by the 
bourgeoisie as the leading class more than two centuries ago, and Europe’s century 
and a half long leading role in global politics ended about half a century ago, we may 
wonder whether the diplomatic institutions they spawned are not also being overtaken 
by other forms. There is certainly enough movement away from the stylized 
diplomacy of eighteenth century Europe to make this a legitimate question. On the 
other hand, the changes in state-based diplomacy, be that in the bilateral diplomacy of 
states or in the multilateral diplomacy of international organizations whose members 
are states, have been incremental, and nothing suggests that the dynamism of change 
has been so slow that these institutions will simply be thrown away as a new tipping 
point emerges. 
 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, extant work on diplomacy tends to discuss 
change in the institution as a function of developments internal to it. However, 
diplomacy is embedded in everyday social life. One strength of an evolutionary 
approach is that it can clearly demonstrate this, by directing attention to how 
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diplomacy’s social and material environment sets in motion developments which lead 
to tipping points. So it is with possible future developments; their origins must be 
sought outside of the institution of diplomacy itself, in diplomacy’s environment. 
There is little doubt that candidate number one is the shift away from a world centred 
around the states system, toward a globalized world, with globalization referring to 
the increase in global social density and the condensation of spatiality and 
temporality. Like its forerunner, internationalism, the selection process is 
characterized by technological innovation in the area of communication, particularly 
software infrastructure and so-called social media. The explosion in public diplomacy 
is a key development here. As a result, an unprecedented degree, what happens in one 
local site is imbricated in developments elsewhere. As flows of people, ideas, trade 
and services increase rapidly, the importance of boundaries between states changes. 
State discreteness is challenged, and with it, state agency. To put it differently, the 
environment for state action changes rapidly, and this cannot but have repercussions 
on a diplomacy whose major agents are state, for it puts the centrality of the state 
system to global politics in question, and raises the question of how states change as 
they try to optimize their role in the new environment. 
 
There are two conventional answers to this question.14  The first is that other, non-
state agents threaten to overtake states. The second is that states keep on as before, 
with the one proviso that they delegate functions to other agents and become the 
principal agent of those other agents. In an evolutionary perspective, the first answer 
is wanting, for there is little or no evidence that the new environment fits other agents 
better than it does states. The second answer also comes up short, for in an 
evolutionary perspective, state delegation means reshuffling, and reshuffling has 
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recursive effects that will change the states that delegate. We must somehow account 
for all that, and I think the best way to do it is to grant the point that new agents 
become more important, and also the point that states seem to be able to harness most 
of the activity of these new agents for their own uses. What is about to happen, then, 
is that the former hierarchy of agents, with states firmly on top and with various kinds 
of non-state agents layered  below them, is being condensed and hybridized. States 
retain their key status, but they become less like territorially bound entities that serve 
as containers for social life, and more like central nodes in networks of agents. 
 
This has immediate repercussions for diplomacy, for it means that state agents may be 
found in other kinds of organizations. The posting of British and French diplomats to 
posts in ostensibly non-state development organizations dates back more than a 
decade. Non-governmental presence in Canadian and Norwegian negotiation teams 
emerged in the 1990s. Less formal use of seemingly free agents by key diplomatic 
agents is as old as institutionalized diplomacy itself. It also means that other 
organizations try to copy diplomatic organizational models for how to operate ‘in the 
field’. Military attachés have done this for centuries. The ‘expat’ divisions of 
transnational companies are usually organized along lines first laid out by diplomats, 
and former diplomats are often employed by them. Non-governmental organizations 
specializing in development aid, humanitarian relief, peace and reconciliation work 
and so on similarly organize their expatriates on models lifted from diplomatic 
services. The new tipping- point, which is already well advanced, is what we may call 
the hybridization of diplomacy; state and non-state actors become more similar, they 
face similar cooperation problems as did other constellations of diplomatic agents 
before them, and they partake of shifting alliances. The central role of states will 
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probably not fade, but states will increasingly have to work with and through other 
kinds of agents, rather than on them, as they usually did before.  As always when a 
new tipping point arises in social spheres, this is not totally new. In a social setting, as 
the example of how right-hand driving conquered Europe bore out, a tipping-point is 
something that is reached gradually. Britain and most of Asia still drives on the left 
hand of the road. A tipping-point is not something that does away with previous 
practices overnight. When looking back at the emergence of diplomacy with a hunch 
that the next tipping-point is hybridization of agents, one spots plenty of forebodings. 
Neither—and this is where the digital example of left-hand vs. right-hand driving no 
longer more complex social stuff such as diplomacy—do new practices totally 
eradicate old ones. The coming of hybridized diplomacy does not mean that a number 
of time-hallowed diplomatic practices will automatically disappear. 
 
We may now, finally, turn to the question of how diplomacy relates to the more 
general question of human cooperation, as it is discussed in the introduction to this 
volume. Messner, Guarín, and Haun write that: 
 
Although all the elements in the cooperation hexagon are important, we 
contend that four of them are necessary to create conditions conducive to 
reciprocity: trust, communication (a key mechanism to develop trust), the  
ability to determine people’s reputation  as trustworthy partners, and the 
perception that the interaction is fair. In addition to these four mechanisms, we 
can use enforcement (via punishment or reward) as a means to rein in 
uncooperative partners. And finally, these mechanisms that enable 
reciprocation are much more likely to emerge within groups that are physically 
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similar or that share a common narrative—in other words, with those with 
which we share a we-identity (Messner, Guarín, and Haun 2013: 16). 
 
When run up against the case of diplomacy, this certainly holds. Punishment is 
famously costly (war) or innefectual (sanctions, embargoes), as are rewards 
(development aid, intention agreements), but the logics are broadly the same as those 
we may identify for cooperation generally. As for the mechanisms concerned, while 
diplomacy is ubiquitous throughout human history, reciprocity was key to the 
formation of diplomatic systems such as the Sumer system, the Amarna system, the 
Iroquois system and the European post-Renaissance system. While scattered cases of 
diplomacy based on symmetrical reciprocity may be observed elsewhere—Sverdrup-
Thygeson (2011) looks at the Chinese case and highlights relations with the Liao in 
the ninth century and the relations with the Russian empire in the seventeenth, and we 
could add relations with the Hsiung-nu during the last two centuries before our era—
they were not permanent enough to take root. While power asymmetries between 
Europe and the rest of the world over the last two hundred years are of course 
absolutely central to understand how European practices became the major source for 
today’s global diplomacy, and examples of how European states drew on power 
asymmetries to ram through diplomatic rules and treaties are rife, the fact that there 
already existed a European system based on reciprocity that could be exported 
globally is, in the light of the introduction to this book, also a factor in understanding 
why it is that other origins have left so few marks on current diplomatic practices 
(Neumann 2012). A particularly illuminating example is the emergence of permanent 
representation, where powers such as the Ottoman Empire and China failed to 
reciprocate by not sending permanent representatives to European powers exactly 
30 
 
because this would be a sign of accepting these powers on an equal basis, and so give 
up on the claim to superiority. As late as twenty years ago, the importance of 
reciprocity was perhaps most easily observed in the quid pro quo practices of 
declaring foreign diplomats as personae non grata. Interestingly, since then, there has 
been a movement away from host countries expelling people, towards a practice 
where states which expect that the host country are about to take such action 
voluntarily send the diplomats involved back. In our perspective, such anticipation 
must be interpreted as yet another victory for cooperation, because it forestalls overt 
quarrels. 
 
The factors that create an institution are not necessarily the same as those that uphold 
it, however. When discussing the future of diplomacy, the relevant thing is not how 
trust, communication, the ability to determine people’s reputation as trustworthy 
partners, and the perception that the interaction is fair played out in previous 
centuries, but rather what is the current state of play. Trust and communication are 
fairly well established. So, as is evident in the existence of an increasingly thick 
diplomatic culture, is we-feeling. To give but one example, Wille (2013) recently 
reported that, when asked why he taught diplomatic skills to young Eastern European 
diplomats that his own country would one day meet in negotiations, their German 
instructor answered that the higher the common understanding of the rules of the 
game, the easier the negotiations, and the higher the chance of getting to yes. 
 
If present-day diplomacy scores highly on all these, we are still left with a major 
problem. In a situation where establish and rising powers are in the middle of a 
prolonged face-off, the key problem is fairness. Emerging powers such as Brazil, 
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China, and India complain that they are not given their due either in institutionalised 
terms or in terms of practices. This is obviously correct. To take a key example, there 
is no reason whatsoever why the country that is already a major player in Asia and is 
about to become the most populous on earth, India, does not have a permanent seat in 
the UN Security Council. A good, if weaker, case may be made for Brazil. Further 
down the list, we find Nigeria. Conversely, there is no reason why Britain and France 
hang onto forty per cent of the permanent seats, instead of the EU having one of, say, 
seven seats. By the same token, it is not immediately clear why G7 decided 
intermittently to include Russia, a weak and probably fading power, while neglecting 
China. In a key arena of cooperation like global warming, rising powers rightly point 
out that established powers became established by burning off a lot of non-renewable 
resources, and that this contributed to us landing where we are. Established powers 
rightly point out that, given where we are, things will certainly deteriorate if rising 
powers follow suit. Once again, the major stumbling block to cooperation in this area 
is fairness. 
 
At certain historical junctures, diplomacy has been singled out as the root cause of the 
world’s ills. After the First World War, many liberals pointed to secret diplomacy as 
the major cause for why war broke out. Revolutionary regimes from France via 
Russia to Iran have blamed diplomacy for why the world order was like it was. 
Today, we sometimes hear that diplomacy is not so much evil as it is out of touch 
with key issues that call for more cooperation. I would argue that all these views are 
mistaken. As I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, diplomacy is a hard-won 
triumph of the species. In an evolutionary perspective, it is the recursive result, and 
not the cause, of cooperation between human polities. It has intensified from small-
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scale to large-scale, from intermittent to permanent, from bilateral to multilateral. 
Viewed closer up, all kinds of specific changes in diplomatic practices are in the 
making, with the articulation of sundry non-state agents to state agents being perhaps 
foremost amongst them. A new tipping-point is on its way. Since evolutionary 
explanations are by definition functionalist and long-term, it makes little sense to 
apply an evolutionary perspective to small-scale changes. Suffice it to say, therefore, 
that it would be highly detrimental for the future of human cooperation to throw away 
the hard-won institution of diplomacy, for it would do no more than face us with the 
task of building something similar all over again. 
 
Notes: 
1 I should like to thank Józef Bátora, Corneliu Bjola, Daniel Cadier, Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen, Håkon Glørstad, Silke Weinlich and Ole Jacob Sending for comments on 
earlier drafts. 
2 I will return to the one exception, namely the work by Ragnar Numelin. 
3 ‘The regulation of social interactions by group-level institutions plays no less a role 
than altruistic individual motives in understanding how this cooperative species came 
to be. Institutions affect the rewards and penalties associated with particular 
behaviors, often favoring the adoption of cooperative actions over others, so that even 
the self-regarding are often induced to act in the interest of the group’ (Bowles and 
Gintis 2011: 5). Where political theory is concerned, it is interesting to note (but not 
necessarily damning to Hobbes, since he is operating at the analytical plane) that these 
findings rather puncture Hobbes’ thought experiment of the social contract, which 
turned on humans giving up their freedom and uniting under a leader. Historically, it 
was the other way around; cooperation evolved exactly to take leaders down some 
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notches, and not to exalt them. Exaltation came later, with large-scale polities. On the 
other hand, Rousseau’s thought experiment of the stag hunt overlaps with an 
absolutely essential evolutionary moment, for it is groups that are able to cooperate in 
bringing down big game and megafauna that gain an evolutionary edge by dint of 
which they crowd out less socially advanced groups.  
4 ‘[…] during the Late Pleistocene [126.000 BC – 12.000 BC] a far greater fraction of 
hunter-gatherers than today lived in large, partially sedentary villages in the relatively 
densely populated resource-rich coastal and riverine environments from which they 
were subsequently expelled by Holocene farmers’ (Bowles and Gintis 2011: 95). 
5 Pointing to the frequent need for galvanizing against natural disasters, however, 
Bowles and Gintis do not see war as a necessary driver of social evolution, as did 
Darwin. 
6 Service (1975: 41) notes a line running from Darwin via Spencer and Bagehot to 
sociologists such as Ludwig Gumplowicz, Franz Oppenheimer, Albion Small and 
Lester Ward. 
7 In a Kantian moment some pages later, he adds hospitality: ‘[I]ntersocietal relations 
are typically maintained by reciprocal exchanges of presents, people (in marriage), 
and hospitality. And if two groups can exchange local specialties that the other lacks, 
amiable relations are better assured’ (Service 1975: 100). 
8 Numelin also published a later and more detailed monograph about Australia and 
Oceania, as well as books in his native Swedish and article in both languages, but they 
add little to his doctoral work. 
9 Numelin (1950: 176) stresses its relative rareness in South America, though.  
10 Numelin (1950: 213) also notes the Maasai habit of letting women from opposite 
parties in peace negotiations suckle one another’s unweaned children. 
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11 Mention should be made here of Hendrik Spruyt’s (1994a; 1994b: 188) work on 
the states system, which did bring the idea of punctuated equilibria to the study of IR. 
However, as Bátora and Hynek (forthcoming) argue in a forthcoming book, 'since 
diplomacy is not seen [by Spruyt] as a specific institution, but rather as a centralized 
gatekeeping tool of newly formed political units, it cannot be linked to the discussion 
of social evolutionary change per se. This can be seen when Spruyt tackles adaptation 
to environmental demands in the context of evolving units in the international system 
but never in the context of diplomacy’. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) talk about 
‘turning points’ in the life cycle of a norm when enough states join its institutionalized 
form; this is an agency-focused use which is very different from an evolutionary take. 
12 Sometimes, only a metaphorical echo remains. Where humans are concerned, the 
expression prick up your ears would be an example of this. 
13 The use of ‘verbal’ here may not be correct, for we do not know when language 
emerged, or even if it emerged suddenly or gradually. Most guesses places the event 
in the BC 100.000-70.000 range. One unresolved tension is the relationship between 
the actuality of big-game hunting, which demands advanced signaling, and the 
emergence of language. 
14 This paragraph summarizes Neumann and Sending 2010. 
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